Network Externality and the Coordination Problem

We show that Rohlfss (1974) model is a special case of a spatial monopoly model á la Hotelling (1929) with uniform consumer distribution and quadratic transportation costs, where location is exogenous and the good yields no intrinsic utility. By relaxing these assumptions, we prove that the coordination problem typically thought to affect markets for network goods may not arise in general. Endogenizing location makes it easier for the monopolist to extract consumer surplus but also to cover the entire market. We also show that the main conclusions remain qualitatively unmodified if consumer distribution is triangular.revised version received September 16, 2003     

我国生态标识食品的发展现状、制约因素与政府干预

本文在介绍我国生态标识食品发展现状的基础上,分析了我国发展生态标识食品的制约因素,提出了生态标识食品的外部性和公共产品属性的重要性及其影响,并就政府对生态标识食品实施市场干预进行了初步探讨.     

财政联邦制、非正式财政与政府债务——对中国转型经济的规范分析

财政联邦制的一个潜在消极后果是,地方政府竞相从事高风险投资项目等脱离中央监督的非正式财政活动,从而引起预算软约束,并导致政府债务的积累。如果地方政府都这么做,就会形成“太多而不能惩罚”的局面。文章还探讨了如何通过改变政府行为导向,改善政府治理来避免这类问题的可能性。     

水资源管理的外部性及其校正策略研究

水资源管理的外部性效应有三种校正策略：法律校正策略、市场校正策略、政府校正策略。在法律校正策略的基础上，应该将市场策略和政府策略相结合。只有将多种手段有机结合，协调互补，才能在水资源管理中发挥最大的效用，兼顾到经济目标、社会目标和生态目标。     

基于G-E-S-N分析的区域可持续发展模式

市场经济条件下地球上各种经济社会区域实际上是被不同属性的物品所占据或分割着,因而,区域构成又可以看成物品的空间构成。在特定自然和人文环境下交织在一起的具有不同外部性的物品及空间构成,对区域可持续发展往往起着重要支配作用。按是否具有排他性和竞争性划分物品类型,据此来探悉物品的基本空间属性和典型结构,文章提出了一种基于G-E-S-N分析,亦即物品空间外部性分析的框架方法,并以登封—少林实验区为例,初步验证了这种理论方法诠释的区域可持续发展模式。     

经理、内部董事与公司财务风险外部化——基于管家理论的视角

经理人内部控制很可能使公司财务风险外部化,造成财务风险的积聚,这是上市公司存在的一种被忽略的代理成本.基于管家理论对内部董事和财务风险的关系所进行的研究发现,公司的财务风险水平同内部董事比呈负相关,而董事长兼任总经理的公司的财务风险也相对较小.这说明,在对经理的监督约束机制相对乏力的情况下,内部董事缓解了由于经理的道德风险和逆向选择可能带给企业的财务风险,而管家理论也更适合解释内部董事的内部人控制问题.     

生态补偿的经济学解释

生态补偿是为了达到保护生态的目的,国家通过制度安排,对生态产品提供者给予的经济补偿。可持续发展是生态补偿的经济伦理基础。外部性理论、公共物品理论和生态资本理论是解释生态补偿存在原因的三大经济理论。福利经济学征收税、费理论和信息经济学的纵向、横向一体化理论释明了生态补偿的政府路径。国外生态补偿保证金制度可资借鉴。     

顾客锁定的作用机理

顾客锁定是交易中的普遍现象。论文通过顾客消费行为的外部性区分了线型锁定和网型锁定两种形式 ,并分析两种锁定的作用机理。     

On the Costs of Excise Taxes and Income Taxes in the UK

This paper develops an analytical framework for estimating the marginal excess burden (MEB) of taxes on gasoline, alcohol, tobacco, and labor in the UK, accounting for externalities and interactions among the taxes. Under most scenarios the MEB of the gasoline tax exceeds that for the labor tax, the MEB of the alcohol tax is roughly the same, while the MEB of the tobacco tax is lower than for the labor tax. These preliminary findings suggest that the gasoline tax may be too high, the alcohol tax might be about right, and the tobacco tax might be too low.     

Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade in Asymmetric Oligopoly Markets

This paper examines optimal cooperative and non-cooperative environmental taxes for the case in which a polluting input is used to produce an internationally-traded finished product. The model allows for terms-of-trade effects under oligopoly and employs a general specification of the environmental damage function that encompasses special cases of local, global, and transboundary externalities. The model has several implications for public finance. For example, inefficiently high environmental taxes may be optimal for a net exporting country in non-cooperative circumstances, as the motive to shift rent by selecting an inefficiently low tax rate is countervailed by the incentive to shift the burden of the tax to foreign consumers. The findings identify the important role of asymmetric trade flows (denominated in both goods and pollution exchange) in determining optimal cooperative and non-cooperative tax policy under oligopoly.